En applicering af liberal intergovernmentalisme på eurokrisen.
Nationale præferencer forklares som et produkt af høj negativ interdependens i euroområdet og den fiskale/finanspolitiske position af dets medlemslande.
– Tyskland og det nordlige europas finanspolitiske position drevet af udbudssiden → eksportdrevne strategier baseret på løn, begrænsninger, produktivitet og konkurrenceevne
– Det sydlige europas finanspolitiske position drevet af eftersppørgselssiden → ekspansiv finanspolitik og løninflation
Konflikten mellem de modstridende præferencer genererede et ‘chicken game’
– Chicken game: “First, the actors have a strong joint preference for avoiding an extremely costly common bad – such as the breakdown of the euro – but also seek to avoid the costs of backing down and making the first move to avert catastrophe.”
– “Simply put, the costs of adjustment in the crisis could either be mutualized, e.g., in the form of Eurobonds or fiscal equalization schemes, in which case the solvent member states of the north would pay for the heavily indebted member states and their banking systems; or adjustment could be nationalized in the form of fiscal austerity, wage and price depression, thus putting the burden of adjustment on the debt-ridden southern countries, forcing them to create the means to service their credits, and sparing the northern countries from bailing out their banks.”
– The stakes were highest for the indebted countries
Nordlige lande foretrak nationale justeringer. Sydlige lande foretrak gensidig justering. Asymmetrisk interdependens placerede Tyskland i en bedre forhandlingsposition, da det sydlige europa havde forgældet sig til Tyskland.
– LI predicts the following pattern of institutional choice in the euro crisis:
1) New and reformed institutions that increase the credibility of the member states’ commitment to the eurozone stability
2) Institutions of financial assistance are more intergovernmental than institutions of supervision
Således blev den regionale integration et produkt at forhandlingerne mellem regeringerne i eurozonen.
Kritikpunkter kan siges at være de samme rettet imod liberal intergovernmentalisme.